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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONS & 
THINGS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
J.-R. Trahan* 
 
Of all the juridical distinctions, the most important opposes 
persons and goods. More than a distinction, it is a 
hierarchy: the person is the grandest of riches, for he has 
an infinite value. The riches of the world are given to man 
so that he may be the master of them; sometimes, they 
become the master of him.  
Philippe Malaurie & Laurent Aynès1
 
If the summa divisio of the civil law–the distinction between 
“persons” and “things”–can be traced back through the pages of 
history to a single source, then that source may well be the 
following line of the Institutes of the second century Roman 
jurisconsult Gaius:2 “Now, all the law that we make use of pertains 
either to persons or to things or to actions.”3  This is not to say that 
the concepts “person” and “thing” were unknown to Gaius’ 
predecessors and contemporaries; they were not.  But Gaius seems 
to have been the first to have set these concepts in an apparent 
binary opposition to each other and almost certainly was the first to 
have attached great significance to that opposition,4 making of it 
 
* James Carville Alumni Professor of Law.  I wish to thank Agustín Parise, 
Research Associate at the Center of Civil Law Studies, for his invaluable 
contributions to the research on which this preface is based. 
1. PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNES, DROIT CIVIL: LES BIENS (2d ed. 
2005) (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2008). 
2. On Gaius and his INSTITUTES, see generally PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW 
IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 19-20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); and BARRY 
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 34-36 (1984). 
3. GAI. INST. bk. I, tit. II, no 8 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2006). 
4. 1 FREDERICK CARL VON SAVIGNY, TRAITÉ DE DROIT ROMAIN § LIX, 
389-90 (Charles Guenoux trans., Firmin Didot Frères 1840) (“[I]t has often been 
claimed, or at least tacitly acknowledged, that among the Romans there had been 
had a very ancient custom of relating the rules of law to three classes of objects: 
persona, res, actio, and that the Roman jurisconsults had all, or nearly all, 
followed these division in their treatises . . .  Now, not a single historical fact 
serves to support it [this claim], and diverse circumstances seem to contradict it. 
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part of the very organizational backbone of his Institutes.5
Though Gaius considered “persons” and “things” to be 
fundamentally different from each other, it is less than entirely 
clear of what he considered this difference to consist.  Absent from 
his Institutes–the only writing of his that has survived–is any 
definition of either term, any explanation of the supposedly 
distinctive “nature” or “essence” of one or the other, on the one 
hand, or “things,” on the other, or any account of the criterion(a) 
that must de used in determining whether a given “something” is 
one or the other. The basis for the distinction, like the distinction 
itself, Gaius appears to have taken to be so “self-evident” as to 
require no explanation. 
Despite Gaius’ silence regarding the basis for the distinction, it 
may be possible to get some idea of his understanding of it by 
looking at the various “somethings” that Gaius and, in addition, his 
predecessors and contemporaries treated under the rubrics 
“person” and “thing,” respectively.  Many Romanists have, in fact, 
attempted to do precisely that.6  And they have arrived at 
something of a consensus. Let us consider, first, the concept 
“person.”  The Roman jurisconsults seem to have taken the 
concept to include, first and most fundamentally, a “human being” 
or, better yet, every human being properly so called,7 even 
including “slaves.”8  To this extent, the term “person” was given 
 
 
. . .  Thus, we have no reasons to regard the division of Gaius as generally 
accepted; rather, we must regard it as a particular idea of this jurisconsult . . . .”) 
5. Gaius’ Institutes are divided into three parts, called “books,” which bear 
the captions of “persons,” “things,” and “actions,” respectively. 
6. See, e.g., 1 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § LIX, at 391-401; 1 JOHN AUSTIN, 
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW) lect. XII, 
at 348-55, & lect. XIII, at 337 & 360-64 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885); 
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60-61 & 98-99  (8th ed. 1982). 
7. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 346, 350, 352; NICHOLAS, supra note 
2, at 60-61. 
8.  1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348-49; NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 
60-61. 
The temporal span of this “human being” stretched from the moment of 
“live birth” (or, for certain limited purposes, such as successions, from the 
moment of conception) until the moment of natural death.  JUST. DIG. bk. 1, tit.5, 
no 7 & bk. 50,tit. 16, no 231 “Live birth” required, among other things, that the 
child be born with “human form” (as opposed to that of a “monster”).  TWELVE 
TABLES tab. IV, law III. 
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its common sense.  But for the Roman jurisconsults the concept did 
not stop there.  To the contrary, it was also extended, at least for 
some purposes, to certain groups or collectivities of human beings 
(e.g. the collegia)9 and, in at least one case, to an aggregate of 
rights and duties, namely, those of an hereditary estate (haereitas 
jacens).10  As applied to such “somethings,” the term “person” was 
used in an analogical or fictitious sense.11  Next, let us consider the 
concept of “thing.”  For the Roman jurisconsults, this concept 
encompassed, first and foremost, physical objects external to the 
human body that can be detected by means of the senses (res 
corporales).12  The term “thing,” to this extent, had its common 
sense.  But the Roman jurisconsults went further, extending the 
concept to cover (1) what we moderns would call “rights” and 
“duties” (so called res incorporales)13 and (2) even, in one 
instance and for limited purposes, a certain class of “person,” 
namely, the slave to the extent that he (or should one now say 
“it”?) might constitute the object of a revindicatory action brought 
by his master.14  Evaluated according to the standards of modern 
legal science, this schema, obviously enough, leaves much to be 
desired.15  
 
9. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 354. 
10. Id. at lect. XII, at 354 & 355. 
11. There is yet another wrinkle in the fabric of the Romans’ understanding 
of “person” that complicates any attempt at explicating that understanding.  This 
wrinkle is the Romans’ failure to differentiate sharply between–indeed, even to 
confuse–“personality,” on the one hand, and “status,” on the other.  See, e.g., 
G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT no 40, at 39 (T.M. Knox trans., 1962); 1 
AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 352-53, & lect. XIII, at 363-64; NICHOLAS, 
supra note 2, at 61; see also 1 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § LIX, at 391-95; see 
generally Jeanne Louise Carriere, From Status to Persons in Book I, Title 1 of 
the Civil Code, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1268-69 (1999). 
12. 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XIII, at 360. 
13. Id. at lect. XIII, at 360 & 361. 
14. Id. at lect. XIII, at 361 & 362-63. 
15. HEGEL, supra note 11, no 40, at 39 (decrying the “perversity and lack of 
speculative thought” in the schema); NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60-61 
(characterizing the schema as “rough and ready” and as lacking a “coherent 
theory”); see also 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XIII, at 361 (complaining that 
the inclusion of “incorporeals” in the category of things creates “perplexing 
ambiguity”) & 2 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XLVI, at 777 (denouncing the 
Roman distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things as “utterly 
useless”); 2 Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Droit Civil Français § 162 (Paul 
Esmein rev., 7th ed. 1961), in 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 6 (La. St. L. Inst. 
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For over a millennium after Gaius, the development of a more 
scientific understanding of the distinction between persons and 
things remained elusive. In his Institutes, Justinian simply 
reproduced Gaius’ statement of the distinction16 word for word and 
without change.  So things remained when, several centuries later, 
first the Glossators17 and then the Commentators18 set to work 
explicating the then recently “rediscovered” works of Justinian. 
For example, Bracton’s Of the Legislation and the Customs of the 
English, a work apparently influenced by the Glossator Azo of 
Bologna,19 we find yet another reproduction, without further 
elaboration, of Gaius’original statement on persons, things, and 
actions.20 Then there are the Las Siete Partidas, a 13th century 
Spanish law compilation that drew on the works of the Glossators 
and early Commentators.21  Though this work speaks of 
“persons”and of “things,” it never defines either term and–this is 
what is really surprising–it never sets the two over in opposition to 
each other. 
Not until the emergence of the new school of “natural law” 
theory in the 16th century, of whom the earliest representative is 
the Dutch Romanist Hugo Grotius, did anyone do much to improve 
on the old Roman schema.  Regarding “persons,” Grotius added 
little to the stock of existing ideas, but what little he did add proved 
to be important: “persons,” he wrote, are those who “have rights to 
things.”22  Though Grotius himself did not say as much, this 
attribute of persons clearly implies–indeed, presupposes–another, 
namely, that persons “can” have such rights, in other words, have 
the “capacity” to receive of acquire them.  (Re-) conceptualizing 
 
 
trans. 1966) (characterizing the Roman distinction between corporeals and 
incorporeal things as “arbitrary”). 
16. JUST. INST. bk. I, tit. III (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2006). 
17. On the Glossators, see generally STEIN, supra note 2, at 45-49; 
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 46-47. 
18. On the Commentators, see generally STEIN, supra note 2, at 71-74; 
NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 46-47. 
19. See FREDERIC MAITLAND, BRACTON AND AZO (1895); CARL 
GUTERBOCK, BRACTON (Brinton Coxe trans., 1866); STEIN, supra note 2, at 64. 
20.  See HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSEUTUDINIBUS ANGLIÆ 
bk. I, ch. VI, at 29 (Travers Twiss ed., 1878). 
21 . See STEIN, supra note 2, at 65-66. 
22. 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND bk. I, ch. II, no 28, 
at 15 (R.W. Lee trans., 1926).  
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“persons” in this way, Grotius effectively made it possible to 
uncouple “personality” from “humanity,” a development that was 
to have lasting significance.  So (re-) understood, the category of 
person could easily embrace collectivities of human beings, though 
Grotius himself seems not to drawn this inference.  Regarding 
“things,” Grotius broke new ground by providing a definition: 
“that which is external to man and in any way useful to man.”23 
For Grotius, “man” evidently meant “mind” or “spirit,” for Grotius 
included among that which is “external to man” not only natural 
objects (such as trees) and man-made objects (such as houses), but 
also the human body, human life itself (understood as physical 
existence), and even certain attributes of human life, such as 
“honor” and “reputation.”24  Perhaps recognizing the potentially 
dangerous implications of this reification of the body, life, honor, 
and reputation, and the like, Grotius introduced a new 
subcategorization of things, the point of which seems to have been 
to foreclose those very implications.  According to Grotius, things 
can be subdivided into “alienable” and “inalienable,” and things 
such as the body, life, honor, and reputation fall into the latter 
subcategory.25
To find still further innovations in thinking about the 
distinction between persons and things, one must “fast forward” 
the tape of history to the early 19th century.26  At that time a 
 
23. Id. at bk. II, ch. I, no 3, at 65. 
24. This definition of “thing” anticipates that of Hegel two hundred years 
later.  See HEGEL, supra note 11, no 42, at 40 (“What is immediately different 
from free mind is that which, both for mind and in itself, is the external pure and 
simple, a thing, something not free, not personal, without rights . . . [W]hen 
‘thing’ is contrasted with ‘person’ . . . it means the opposite of what is 
substantive, i.e. that whose determinate character lies in its pure externality.  
From the point of view of free mind  .  .  .  the external is external absolutely, 
and it is for this reason that the determinate character assigned to nature by the 
concept is inherent externality.”). 
25. In drawing this new distinction, Grotius at the very least anticipated, if 
he did not in fact lay the groundwork for, the development years later of the 
distinction between “patrimonial” and “extra-patrimonial” rights.  On this 
distinction, see generally FRANÇOIS TERRÉ & PHILIPPE SIMLER, DROIT CIVIL: 
LES BIENS no18, at24-25, &  nos 23-26, at 29-32 (7th  ed. 2006); JEAN 
CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION no 166, at 321; Aubry & Rau, supra 
note 15, § 162, at 5-6. 
26. One familiar with the history of the civil law tradition will recognize 
that, in passing from the 16th century to the 18th century, I have skipped over a 
number of “big names” within that tradition, including Jean Domat and Robert 
14           JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES                  [Vol. 1 
 
                                                                                                            
number of scholars, most of them in Germany,27 provided 
something of a new “take” on “persons,” “things,” or both and, in 
so doing, developed what many now call the “modern” 
understanding of persons and things.28   
Regarding “persons,” the modern theory breaks new ground at 
two points.  First, the modern theory (re-) defines “person” as the 
“subject of rights and duties,” in the sense of that which is 
“capable” of being “subjected” to duties and/or of being “invested” 
with rights.29  The following passage from the work of the German 
Romanist Anton Thibaut is fairly typical: 
 
 
Pothier.  This is not an oversight.  Though both of these great civilists 
recognized the distinction between persons and things, neither of them did much 
to clarify either concept or to fix with greater precision the boundaries between 
the two.  Their theoretical interests clearly lay elsewhere. 
27. Austin attributes this development to “modern civilians.” 1 AUSTIN, 
supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348, 350, & 351.  Given Austin’s background, the 
scholars he had in mind were probably the early German Pandectists, such as 
Hugo, Thibaut, Puchta, and Savigny. 
28. See NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60; see also 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, 
lect. XII, at 348, 350, & 351. 
29. See ANTON THIBAUT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
JURISPRUDENCE § 101, at 88 (Nathaniel Lindley trans., 1855); G.F. Puchta, 
Outlines of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right § 28, in WILLIAM HASTIE, 
OUTLINES OF THE SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1887); 2 SAVIGNY, supra 
note 4, § LX, at 1; also 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348, 350-51, 352, 
353 & lect. XIII, at 358.  Austin considered the (re-) conceptualization of 
“person” in terms of “subject of rights and duties” to be the result of an error.  1 
AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XII, at 348, 350-54.  Is it not possible, however, that 
it is, on the contrary, the result of an attempt to “re-think” the traditional Roman 
distinction between person and thing so as to put it on a sounder scientific 
footing?  See 1 SAVIGNY, supra note  4, § at 400 (“[N]o reason obliges us to 
imitate servilely what are acknowledged defects, and we can, without being 
presumptuous and without being prideful, try to put the historical materials of 
the Roman law into operation in a rational manner and to present them under 
another form than that adopted by Gaius.”). 
This new notion of the “subject” of rights and duties formed one of the 
conceptual cornerstones of the distinction, elaborated sometime later, between 
the two senses of “law” or “right,” namely, “subjective” law or right (in French, 
droit subjectif) and “objective” law or right (in French droit objectif).  On this 
distinction, see generally MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 1, no 41, at 40; 
CARBONNIER, supra note 25, no 104, at 191; no 105, at 193; & no 163, at 315 
(26th ed. 1999); Aubry & Rau, supra note 15, § 162, at 1; HANS KELSEN, PURE 
THEORY OF LAW 169-70 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1978); JEAN DABIN, LE 
DROIT SUBJECTIF (1952). 
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We have next to consider the subjects of rights and duties, 
that is to say, the persons to whom something is possible 
or necessary.  In the first place we must examine who or 
what, either from its very nature or by the precepts of 
positive law, can be considered as capable of rights and 
duties.  By Person is meant whatever in any respect is 
regarded as the subject of a right: by Thing, on the other 
hand, is denoted whatever is opposed to person.30
This manner of (re-) defining person marks an important shift–
indeed, a reversal–in thinking about “personality.”  Whereas in 
earlier times “being a person” was thought to be logically prior to 
and to be the cause of “having legal capacity,” hereafter “having 
legal capacity” will be thought to be logically prior to and to be the 
cause of “being a person.”31 Second, the modern theory establishes 
a new “umbrella” category into which the various non-natural 
persons (collegia, corporations, etc.) can be conveniently placed, 
namely, “moral” (in the sense of “psychological”) or “juridical” 
person.32 This passage from the work of the German Romanist 
Savigny is representative: 
[Up to this point] I have dealt with the capacity of law as 
something that corresponds to the idea of the individual; 
here, I will envision it as something that is extended 
artificially to fictitious beings.  One calls them “juridical 
persons,” that is to say, persons who exist only for 
juridical ends, and these persons appear to us alongside 
the individual, as subjects of relations of law.33
Attempts at specifiying the “true nature” of such “juridical 
persons,” though often made, have usually ended in failure or, at 
the very least, confusion.34
 
30. THIBAUT, supra note 29, § 101, at 88. 
31. See Carriere, supra note 11, at 1266-67 (1999) (“. . . Aubry and Rau in 
the late nineteenth century, and Planiol and Ripert in the early twentieth, 
regarded juridical capacity as definitional of personality, rather than as a 
consequence of it:  Persons are ‘[t]hose beings capable of having rights and 
obligations.’  Nicholas characterizes this view as that of ‘the modern lawyer’.”). 
32. See THIBAUT, supra note 29, § 113, at 93; 2 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § 
LX, at 1. 
33. 2 SAVIGNY, supra note 4, § LXXXV, at 234. 
34. See generally Puchta, supra note 29, § 28, at 101-02; 2 SAVIGNY, supra 
note 4, § LXXXV, at 237-39; KELSEN, supra note 29, at 172; HANS KELSEN, 
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Regarding “things,” the thinking of the modern theorists seems 
to have headed off in two rather different, if not opposing, 
directions.  On the one hand, at least some theorists provided an 
even more expansive definition of “thing” than did Grotius, 
namely, “all that which is not a ‘subject’.”  To this non-subject, 
these theorists gave the new term “object.” As Thibaut put it, “By 
thing (res) is meant whatever neither is nor can be the subject of a 
legal relation, but yet may be the object of a legal transaction and 
so mediately the object of a right . . .”35  Other theorists, however, 
provided a restrictive definition of “thing,” one that limited that 
category to what the Romans called res corporales that is, natural 
and man-made objects that exist in time and in space and that can 
be sensed.36  A good example of this restrictive definition is 
provided by the German Romanist Puchta: 
The jural relationships in which man stands as an 
individual relate to the external goods which he needs for 
his existence. These goods–the earth, with what it 
produces and that man makes thereof–are primariy 
destined for the supply of the wants which he has  . . . 
The principle of right does not deal with these external 
goods in all their natural multiplicity, but it brings into 
prominence their univeral character as destined for man 
and his wants. This common characteristic is expressed by 
the word “thing”. . . 37
The true point of restricting the category of “things” in this 
way was to expel from that category a class of “somethings” that, 
in the minds of these theorists, had never properly belonged there, 
namely, so-called “incorporeal” things.  For these theorists, that 
class of “somethings,” scientifically understood, belonged in a 
different category altogether, namely, that of “rights” or 
“obligations.”38  The effect of this reclassification, obviously 
 
 
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 97-98 (Anders Wedberg trans., 
1945). 
35. THIBAUT, supra note 29, § 146, at 116.  This seems to be the definition 
Nicholas has in mind when he states that, for a modern lawyer, “things” refers to 
“rights and duties themselves.”  NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 60.  
36. Puchta, supra note 29, § 23, at 69-70. 
37. Id. 
38. See, e.g., 1 AUSTIN, supra note 6, lect. XIII, at 361-62, & 2 AUSTIN, 
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enough, is a re-“materialization” of the concept of “thing.”   
During the 20th century a number of thinkers within the civil 
law tradition took yet another look at one or another of the aspects 
of the distinction between persons and things.  Perhaps the most 
famous of these thinkers was the German civilist and positivist 
legal philosopher Kelsen.  As was his wont, when he came to the 
traditional concept of “person,” he set about attempting to 
demythologize39 it.  Because his point of view is so distinctive and 
because it became so influential, at least in some quarters, his 
remarks merit being reproduced at length: 
The concept of the legal person–who, by definition, is the 
subject of legal duties and legal rights–answers the need 
of imagining a bearer of rights and duties. Juristic thinking 
is not satisfied with the insight that a certain human action 
or omission forms the contents of a duty or a right.  There 
must exist something that “has” the duty or the right.  In 
this idea a general trend of human thought is manifested.  
Empirically observable qualities, too, are interpreted as 
qualities of an object or a substance, and grammatically 
they are represented as predicates of a subject.  This 
substance is not an additional entity.  The grammatical 
subject denoting it is only a symbol of the fact that the 
qualities form a unity. . .40
. . . What, now, does the statement of traditional theory 
mean that the legal order invests the human being, or a 
group of human beings, with the quality of legal 
personality–with the qualify of being a “person”?  It 
means that the legal order imposes obligations upon, or 
confers rights to, human beings, that is, that the legal 
order makes human behavior to content of obligations and 
rights.  “To be a person” or “to have a legal personality” is 
identical with having legal obligations and subjective 
 
 
supra note 6, lect. XLVI, at 777; see generally NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 98-
99.  The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) reflects this sharp 
distinction between “things,” on the one hand, and “rights,” on the other, 
together with this restrictive definition of the former.  See BGB § 90 (“Only 
corporeal objects are things as defined by law”). 
39. See KELSEN, supra note 34, at 93. 
40. Id.  
18           JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES                  [Vol. 1 
 
                                                                                                            
rights.  The person as a holder of obligations and rights is 
not something that is different from the obligations and 
rights, as whose holder the person is presented–just as a 
tree which is said to have a trunk, branches, and blossoms, 
is not a substance different from trunk, branches, and 
blossoms, but merely the totality of these elements.  The 
physical or juristic person who “has” obligations and 
rights as their holder, is these obligations and rights–a 
complex of legal obligations and rights whose totality is 
expressed figuratively in the concept of “person.” 
“Person” is merely the personification of this totality.41
. . . The statement that a person has duties and rights . . .  
is meaningless or an empty tautology.  It means that a set 
of duties and rights, the unity of which is personified, 
“has” duties and rights. . . . But it is nonsense to say that 
law imposes duties and rights upon persons such a 
statements means that law imposes duties upon duties and 
confers rights upon rights . . .42
So (re-) conceived, the “person” dematerializes completely; he 
ceases to be even the disembodied “mind” of Grotius. The person 
is not something that, existing somehow apart from legal rules, 
constitutes rights and duties on the basis of those rules; rather, he is 
created by those rules and is constituted by those rights and duties!  
In this way the person becomes a mere “ghost in the machine” of 
the legal order.43
Influential though it may have been, Kelsen’s 
reconceptualization of legal personhood failed to gain the 
allegiance of everyone.  Take, for example, the Belgian civilist and 
natural law philosopher Jean Dabin.  In his view, talk of a subject 
of rights presupposes some “being” that exists prior to its 
becoming a subject of rights.44  The argument runs as follows: 
But if subjective right is, in fact, in a certain manner a 
 
41. KELSEN, supra note 29, at 172-73. 
42. KELSEN, supra note 34, at 95. 
43. Law brings us back to the etymological meaning.  The Latin word 
persona first meant “theatrical mask.”  The word was borrowed to the Etruscan 
phersu, designating a mask, before moving to the Greek and the Latin: 
DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (Alain Rey ed., Robert, 
2006), v. Personne. 
44.  DABIN, supra note 29, at 107. 
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relation, insofar as it is opposable to another . . . every 
relation presupposes, by definition, that there be beings in 
relation.  Now, one of the beings in relation is precisely 
the legal subject, the others being the persons who are 
obliged to respect the right of the subject . . .45
This is not to say that Dabin advocates a return to some earlier 
conception of “person,” such as that of the German Pandectists or 
Grotius.  He does not.  In fact, Dabin raises the question whether it 
might not be better to dispense with the notion of “person” 
altogether, retaining, in its stead, that of “subject.”46  According to 
Dabin, the concepts “person” and “subject” are not, as has so often 
been assumed, equivalent.  In contrast to the relatively more 
malleable and contentless concept of “subject,” that of “person,” 
he contends, 
is introduced into scientific and philosophical language in 
order to signify a notion that, though it no doubt is related 
to the notion of legal subjects, nevertheless is different: 
that of a being endowed with a reasonable nature and, as 
such, having an end (purpose) of its own . . .47
As Dabin sees it, this concept, though apt for describing human 
beings, fails as a description of collectivities of human beings.48   
“Human beings is a reasonable ‘substance,’ but groups are only 
‘accidents:’ is not reasonable substance a necessary condition for 
personality?” he asks rhetorically.49  The answer, of course, is 
“yes.” 
Between the time of Kelsen and Dabin and the present time, 
the distinction between persons and things seems to have fallen off 
the research agendas of most civilian legal scholars.50  But that 
may soon be changing.  The impetus for this change comes not 
from within but from without the academy, specifically, from the 
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50.  There is one notable exception.  Between the end of the 1970s and the 
end of the 1980s, Michel Villey and the others associated with the “Archives of 
the Philosophy of Law,” published two sets of essays on the distinction: Les 
biens et les choses, 24 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1979), and Le sujet 
de droit, 34 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (1989). 
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society at large.  Thanks to recent social and technological 
changes, our society now faces a number of new social problems, 
problems as to which the distinction between persons and things is 
highly pertinent.  One such problem is the characterization of the 
human fetus.  As long as abortion was criminalized, the ancient 
question of whether a fetus was merely a part of the mother’s body 
(and, therefore, a “thing”) or an independent human being (and, 
therefore, a “person”) was no great practical significance.  But 
when, thanks to the women’s rights movement and the so-called 
“sexual revolution,” restrictions on abortion began to fall, this 
question came to the forefront of public attention.  Another such 
problem is the characterization of animals.  The rise of the 
environmental movement has precipitated a reexamination, on the 
philosophical plane, of the place of human beings within the larger 
natural world.  The traditional view–that the natural order was 
created for man and that he, as master of it, is free to do with it 
more or less as he pleases–has been increasingly challenged.  As a 
result, proposals made, but rejected, in times past to establish for 
animals some kind of status intermediate between that of “things” 
and “persons” are once again attracting attention.  Finally, there is 
the problem–perhaps one should say problems–that have arisen as 
a result of the development of new artificial reproductive 
technologies.  Faced with the novel and, in some cases, utterly 
fantastic products of these technologies–not only “supernumerary 
embryos,” but also “clones” and “chimeras”–, our society grapples 
with what to make of them (are they persons or things?) and what 
to do with them (should they be given rights and, if so, what 
rights?).  If the law is to respond to these problems, it will require, 
among other things, an adequate theory of the distinction between 
persons and things.  Revisiting that distinction, then, could not be 
more timely. 
